

ADVANCE COPY

AP103/A12
Serial 02

U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK

Reg. No.	L-22
R. S. No.	CJB/efo

15 January 1945

2 0116

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Transport Division FIVE (Temporary) (Captain R. W. Abbott, USN).
(2) Commander Amphibious Group III, Pacific Fleet.
(3) Commander Transport Division THIRTY-EIGHT (Temporary) (Captain G.W. Johnson, USN).
(4) Commander Amphibious Group VII, Pacific Fleet.
(5) Commander THIRD Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.
(6) Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.
(7) Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.
(8) Commander, Administrative Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
(9) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - Lingayen Assault, 11-12 January 1945.

Reference: (a) Cincpac file A2-11/A12 serial 1CL-45 of 1 January 1945.

PART IV ORDNANCE

A-1(a) Expended ten rounds of 20mm ammunition at 1852 item, 11 January, 1945, against enemy high altitude bomber.

A-1(b) The above expenditure was due to poor fire discipline of one gunner who fired without orders.

A-1(c) The fire was ineffective.

A-1(d) The ship has no automatic weapons forward of the after side of number two hatch and none aft of the forward side of number five hatch. It is believed that there should be some additional automatic weapons in the forward 160 feet of the ship, where none are now located, for protection against suicide bombers and torpedo planes.

PART V DAMAGE

A-1(a) Several pieces of shrapnel landed on deck but caused no material damage as a result of a short from neighboring ship during the bomber attack during evening twilight on 11 January 1945.

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PART VI SPECIAL COMMENTS AND INFORMATION

C-1 Troops and Cargo.

Merchant Marine ship's characteristics of 1942 were available to Army loading authorities for use in planning the cargo and troop stowage aboard this vessel prior to her arrival at the staging area. Since conversion by the Navy this vessel's cargo stowage space has been drastically reduced in holds #1, 2, and 5; and #4 hold has been eliminated entirely. Resulting time-loss and confusion necessitated by remaking the stowage plan and tables could have been prevented if Army had received a copy of this vessel's Navy Transport Characteristics. Data covering troop capacity was lacking to them or erroneous.

The directive of 300 tons cargo maximum for all AP types was not received by the Army loading authorities. No information on whether this 300 ton figure was LONG or SHORT tons was available to the Commanding Officer when loading was started.

Standard Army Unit Personnel and Tonnage tables and all other standard Navy cargo and troop forms as given in the Transport Doctrine, September, 1944, were not available to the Army loading authorities. Navy forms had to be made up from the data on the Army stowage plans and cargo lists after their receipt aboard ship before reports and stowage plans could be forwarded to the Transport Division Commander for further distribution. Forms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 of the Transport Doctrine Chapter 19 were not all needed on the operation. Those used were forms 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8. Two supplementary forms found necessary in past operation for the ship's use were added to the above forms: "Master Disembarkation Plan" giving breakdown of Boat Teams by number and organization; "Hatch Unloading Time and Priority Table" giving itemized list and tonnage of cargo for each individual cargo hatch, type of boat needed and estimated time of unloading for each item. Form #4 was improved by the addition of data on number of loads, number of heavy lifts, and number of light lifts in each hatch.

Form #8 could not be made out in quadruplicate without delaying each loaded cargo boat until the four copies had been typewritten at central Bridge Control. Army cargo hatch officers instead made out a single hand-written copy which was put in the last net lowered into each boat. Coxswains were

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instructed to show it to the traffic control officer, then proceed to the beach as directed and leave the copy with the beachmaster. Hatch checkers' records are used to determine percentage unloaded for the numerous reports to the O.T.C. during unloading.

No waterproofing compound for vehicles was obtainable at the staging area or assembly port.

Army planning failed to cover the fact that the cargo working parties who unload the ship must be the same men who load the ship. The troop organization chosen for loading the ship was a hospital evacuation unit needed ashore S plus 2 day. Some substitutions had to be made but the key NCO's and men had to stay aboard to unload the ship much to the detriment of the tactical value of the hospital when set up ashore.

This error and others could have been eliminated if copies of the Transport Doctrine were made available to all Army loading authorities to standardize procedure and forms in combined operations.

Concern over the use of steel and chain debarkation ladders and nets was very evident among troops and officers. Chains are so rough from corrosion that troops and officers automatically put their hands on the horizontal rungs as they debark, slowing the men down very appreciably and resulting further in some troops' hands being stepped on by those above. Surging of boats alongside also damaged the lower five feet of these nets, even though the net ends were raised with hand lines as each boat approached. Troops disembark much faster on manila nets and boats do not damage them. Troops are still trained on manila nets at base camps and ports of embarkation. The conclusion is that manila debarkation nets in good condition are superior to chain nets for speed, facility, and safety of debarking troops.

Loss of time and much extra labor was involved in disembarking one large Marine Corps unit due to a mistake in their orders from Army embarkation authorities. These troops brought bed rolls lashed around cots to the ship during embarkation with instructions to load them into a cargo hold. Their barracks bags had been sent to another ship as cargo. Exactly the reverse procedure was followed by all other troops due to the fact that this vessel's cargo holds must be closed before putting up troop bunks in the squares of the hatches, all gear being brought aboard with the troops having to be stowed in their own compartments. The Marines had to stow the bulky rolls in bunks and along restricted

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alleyways between. Bed rolls were manhandled on deck the night before debarkation and then moved once more into cargo nets during debarkation.

The beach planned for the discharge of cargo was orange beach under the control of Commander Transport Division TWENTY-EIGHT. He had departed on the arrival of the ship at Lingayen. On arrival, this task unit reported to Commander Task Force 79, then on his order to Commander Task Group 79.1, and then on the latter's order to Commander Task Unit 79.3.3. Boats had been lowered, but the shifting of berth and beach delayed sending boats to the beach until about 1100 although the ship had arrived at 0700. CTU 79.3.3 departed on the day of our arrival and left the beach without a beachmaster. On S plus three day an officer and five men were sent ashore with a SCR 610 but the beach was changed to Calmay village on the Dagupan river about noon by CTG 79.1. The army requested this beach not be used after the first trip there. Fortunately, further boat trips were not required.

After assignment was obtained to crimson-yellow, beachmaster in control was constantly having to clear his frequency of the unauthorized traffic before he could send his urgent messages. After 1600 no messages from any beachmaster at crimson-yellow were received. This resulted in the loss of one LCM and all its cargo which could have been avoided if surf conditions could have been reported. No shore party was available after 1700 on any beaches, but this fact was also not known by the ship due to absolute lack of communication. Operation of our small beach party the following day was highly satisfactory due to use of 610 radio.

LCM's proved the most valuable of all landing craft in the surf during S plus 2 and S plus 3 days. LSM's were used for vehicles and general cargo on S plus 3 instead of just for vehicles, resulting in much lost use of these craft for other ships due to lengthy time of unloading of general cargo. LCVP's proved highly satisfactory for personnel landing as the load could be removed faster after these craft first grounded. Except in a few cases, all LCVP's that carried cargo were broached by the time the cargo could be removed by manhandling to the beach.

Size and organization of cargo and boat working parties of troops proved very satisfactory. Total of 126 men were used in two sections. While the LSM's were taking general cargo on average time of 2 minutes per sling load was maintained. Each sling load averaged one ton. Twenty-eight tons of general cargo were unloaded from No. 5 hatch in exactly one hour. This time was the best recorded and is considered maximum possible tonnage per hour for continuous discharging.

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Disembarkation of troops at both sides of the promenade deck and their baggage at both sides of No. 3 hatch with cargo gear was highly satisfactory, averaging 28 minutes per boat team of thirty men. It in no way interfered with cargo discharging at hatches 1, 2, and 5. Some loss of time between disembarkation of boat teams was due to stopping disembarkation for chain net repairs. These lock-type unwelded chains part very easily when boats surge against them. Troops had to be sent down these nets single file in the center to prevent injury to hands when metal rungs slammed against the side of the ship with a whipping motion on each net edge as ship rolled and boat surged below.

Present cargo gear location and rigging is satisfactory for simultaneous discharging of cargo as follows: port side No. 1 and No. 2 hatches and starboard side No. 5 hatch (all general light cargo); starboard side No. 2 hatch for vehicles. Changeover of wire whips on two winches is necessary at No. 5 hatch between the time the last heavy lift is discharged and the time light cargo can be handled. This is also necessary at No. 1 hatch. Outriggers on jumbo booms are very satisfactory. No gear carried away even though the ship rolled at times and some lifts were very heavy.

Casualty loading at starboard side No. 3 hatch was necessary due to cargo unloading at No. 1, 2, and 5 hatches, but the extra height caused no inconvenience nor loss of time. Litters were carried down one deck at the wide central ladder in the center of the ship without apparent difficulty.

Repair space for both LCM's and LCVP's on deck at No. 4 hatch proved very essential. The new jumbo boom at that hatch enabled many boats of both types to be brought aboard for repairs and discharged rapidly.

Use of "Hatch Unloading Experience Tables" (Transport Doctrine, September 1944) proved very valuable in accurately recording the percentage of unloaded from each hatch and the number of boatloads dispatched. Hatch officers reported to bridge control by phone at half-hour intervals the number of netloads unloaded and cargo reports were made accurately and quickly despatched.

On-the-spot contact with cargo working parties in the holds by the Cargo Officer and Assistant Ship's TQM prevented accidents and slowdowns in unloading cargo and insured proper use of cargo gear, rollers, nets, etc. Army hatch officer at each hatch performed very satisfactorily in making out cargo tickets, directing loading of boats, and despatching boats to the beach.

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C-1(a) Designation and number of embarked troops were as follows;

XIV CORPS

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Marine Air Group 24	24	308
39th M.P. Co.	1	
Casual Det. 37th Inf. Div.		10
963rd Eng. Maintenance Co.		5
HQ Btry 517th FA Bn.	4	54
Service " " "	2	23
Medical Dt. " " "	1	5
Hq&Hq Det. 268th QM Bn.		2
" " " 493rd QM Bn.	8	17
90th OrdHvMaintCo.(Tank)	6	156
21st Evac. Hospital	43	347
2nd Plat. 146st E.M. Co.	1	22
American Red Cross	1	
670th Eng. Topo.Co. Corps.	3	75
Hq&Hq Btry XIV Corps Art.	8	34
Hq&Hq Co. 754th Tank Bn.		34
Det. S.V. Co. " " "	2	51
Btry C 373rd AA S.L. Bn.	2	83
Hq Bn. " " " "	1	22
Army B&S Bn (LCM Crews)	1	23
637th Tank Destroyer Bn.	1	89
737th Ordnance Co. (LM)	4	71
HQ Det. 82nd Cml. Bn(MTZ)	6	142
3349 QM Truck Co.	2	64
HQ&HQ Co. XIV Corps	12	42
Army TQM and Sgt.	1	1
	<u>134</u>	<u>1680</u>

C-1(b) Troops were embarked on 22-23 December, 1944, at Cape Torokina, Bougainville, Solomon Islands. Troops were disembarked at Lingayen assault beaches on 11-12 January 1945.

C-1(c) Type quantity of cargo embarked was as follows: (See Appendix A, "Consolidated Unit Personnel and Tonnage Table").

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C-1(c-1) Cargo was loaded from and to beaches. Stowage was conventional combat without priorities.

C-1(d) Cargo was loaded at Cape Torokine, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, on 30 November - 1 December, 1944, and discharged on 11-12 January, 1945, on to Lingayen assault beaches and landing ships medium.

C-2(a) Ten LCVP's were carried plus four LCM(3)'s of the Army Engineers which was picked up at Finschhaven on 27 November, 1944. The regularly assigned LCM(3)'s of this vessel were transferred temporarily to the Commander Naval Base, Hollandia, New Guinea.

C-2(b) Landing Craft were carried as follows: Three LCVP's each on number one and five hatches, and two LCM(3)'s with LCVP nested in each LCM(3) on number two and four hatches. Landing craft were launched from 0805 to 0915, item, on 11 January, 1945. Due to high surf at the beaches, an average of one half of the boats were operative at a time; this does not include the two boats as smoke floats and for provisioning minor war vessels. Three LCVP's were stranded high and dry. Two LCVP's were left behind due to bread-down and failure to rejoin the ship prior to the time of her ordered departure. Boat personnel left behind were ordered visually to report to Senior Officer Present Afloat. The landing craft usually needed repairs after each trip to the beach. Two of the antique Army LCM(3)'s were operative and two swamped on the beach on the departure of the ship.

C-4(b) This ship was part of a task unit no ship of which was allowed or had on board the personnel or equipment of a beach party.

C-5(b) This ship loaded casualties from an APH for the two hours prior to sailing from the assault area.

D-1 This ship does not have a combat information center.

D-1(a-4) The surface search radar does not have IFF.

D-2(a) Manus Fox was blanked out for a period of about four minutes apparently due to friendly ship or station tuning a transmitter at 101543 zebra.

TBS was blanked out several times on the afternoon (item) of 12 January, 1945, apparently due to an improperly tuned CW friendly transmitter.

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Time was lost in calibrating SCR equipment in the assault area due to a change in the assignment of this vessel from the scheduled Transport Division 28 to Transport Division 38. This ship is not allowed a frequency meter.

D-2(b) This ship has the personnel allowance of a convoy loaded transport and not of an assault transport. A communication team was not placed aboard. Enroute to and at the objective the three signalmen and two signal strikers stood practically continuous dawn to dusk duty and a watch of at least two in five at night. The amount of traffic handled frequently required pressing into use the boatswain's mate, quartermaster, and messenger of the watch, as well as the signal and communication officers.

The Administrative Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, has indicated by endorsement to a request for increased personnel, that three signalmen and three radiomen would be placed aboard for amphibious operations. It is hoped that while operating with the Southwest Pacific Force such added personnel will be supplied in the future.

Enroute to the objective several lengthy relays to all ships were transmitted, some of which might well have been covered at least in part by orders prior to sortie.

Enroute this ship was the fourth ship in the center column of transports and it required in one case 16 hours to receive a priority relay.

For the first five days after sortie from Manus every relay had obvious and glaring errors in it. The errors were such as to change the sense of the message and the intent of the originator was unknown. A request to verify was followed by a "correct" so soon as to indicate that the communication watch officer had not verified the message prior to its retransmission or after the request to verify.

Nan equipment is slower than the usual visual equipment and accounts for the delay in lengthy relays even though relay is started as soon as first fifty groups are received.

D-2(d) The procedure, calibration, volume, modulation, and control of the TBS circuit of Commander Amphibious Group III enroute to the objective and return was considered outstanding. The standby circuit, on 34.8 megacycles, was either improperly tuned or the antenna was so placed that there was

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structural interference for the first two days after sortie; this condition was adequately corrected and is entitled to the same praise thereafter as the TBS.

There is the usual complaint that voice circuit discipline was poor in the assault area. It is suggested that some of this may be due to the lack of assignment of sufficient frequencies. There is no better explanation to my mind for the repeated use of the tactical circuit for administrative as occurred at Lingayen.

A copy of the change to voice calls was received just prior to departure; one page of the corrections was missing. As a consequence I did not know for example whether " Giraffe One" was meant for the Manley or COMLTCI GROUP 61.

The choice of voice calls could have been better: e. g., "Blitz" and " Blitzen".

D-3 The area in which the ship was anchored was provided general smoke coverage by minor war vessels and LCI.

Gaps in the smoke coverage were filled by using two LCVP's as smoke boats.

M-1 smoke pots last six minutes, give a poor smoke, and flame, and are a fire hazard to the boat. Several pots were defective, and endangered LCVP's and crews.

M-4 smoke floats give an excellent smoke for twelve minutes and when used with Mark 2FM mixture tank gave an excellent smoke coverage.

Whistle signals were the best for stopping smoke since flags were invisible and the smoke circuit voice radio unintelligible.

D-5 The ship had the shunt field coils of a forced draft blower and a steering motor shorted in the staging area. The ship left the staging area early and with the excellent assistance of the SIERRA (AD18) had both repaired prior to sortie from Manus.

D-6 Six tons of provisions were issued to minor war vessels in the Lingayen area.

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D-7 Forty-nine casualties and survivors were received just prior to departure from Lingayen.

PART VII PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. See Appendix B for copy of report on personnel casualties.
2. The following survivors were received with the above casualties and do not require hospitalization:

NAVY

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>Service No.</u>	<u>Organization</u>
ACUFF, John Edgar	EM1c	832-78-55	USNR USS LCI-974
KELLER, Paul Bloomey	F1c	931-17-91	USNR USS LCI-974
PITTMAN, Dean LeRoy	MoMM2c	875-22-71	USNR USS LCI-974
WOOF, William Victor	SC3c	945-26-89	USNR USS LCI-974
SPARKS, Buford (n)	Ensign	270874	USNR USS LCI-974

ARMY

BEJSTER, Felix G.	Pfc	36818396	USA USS LCI-974
JUUL, John E.	T-5	20942182	USA USS LCI-974
LIVELY, Thomas B.	Pvt	39131515	USA USS LCI-974
STAKER, Laurence D.	Sgt	39525563	USA USS LCI-974
STEPONITIS, Stanley C.	Pvt	36818396	USA USS LCI-974
TATE, Fleet L.	Cpl	33091428	USA USS LCI-974

PART VIII LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A voice procedure or challenge to act as a standby for IFF between friendly surface units at night appears to be essential. This to cover failures of IFF, lack of IFF on surface search radar of ships in the unit, and IFF deception by the enemy. Voice calls will not do as all ships do not hold all voice calls and they change.

C.J. BALLREICH.

66;

Cominch (1) (Direct).
Cincpac (3) (Direct).
ComAdComPhibsPac (1) (Direct).
ComPhiBsPac (1).
BuOrd (1).

APPENDIX A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONSOLIDATED
UNIT PERSONNEL AND TONNAGE TABLE

ARMY: XIV CORPS
(unit)

NONE
(Code Marking)

To be embarked on U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK

DATE: December

		Troop Officers <u>134</u>	Troop Enlisted <u>1680</u>	Total <u>1814</u>	
	Line No.		Sq.ft	Cu.ft.	(lbs) Weight
T S R P O A O C P E	1	"A" BAGS	X	5,442	136,050
	2	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	X	10	9
	4	TOTAL LINES 1-3		5,452	136,145
G E N E R A L	5	ORGANIZATION EQUIPMENT	X	10,288	230,451
	6	RATIONS: C, D, K,	X	2,830	63,392
	8	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 1 Reefer box	X	409	5,376
	10	TOTAL LINES 5-9		13,527	299,219
V E H I C L E S	12	towed guns VEHICLES (wheeled & tracked)	3,776	28,977	316,579
	13	TOTAL LINES 11-12	3,776	28,977	316,579
	14	TOTAL WEIGHT OF PERSONNEL per man 224 lbs.			401,126
	15	TOTAL LINES 4, 10, 14, 13	3,776	47,956	1,153,069
R E P L A C E M E N T S		OTHER SUPPLIES (To be filled in by Troop TQM only)			
	20	Medical	x	1,510	33,824
	26	Total Lines 16, 26	x	1,510	33,824
	29	Petroleum Products	x	660	21,638
	31	Grand Total Lines 15, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30	3,776	50,126	1,208,531
32	Total Weight in <u>LONG</u> tons	x	x	540	

U.S.S. PRESIDENT FOLK (AF-103)

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CASUALTY REPORT

NAME IN FULL RANK OR RATE SERIAL NO.	TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE & PLACE OF CASUALTY	DUTY STATUS	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	FLYING STATUS	SOURCE OF ADMISSION	DISPOSITION
GOBER, Asberry Webb Ens USNR 357436	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-1028 LINGAYEN GULF P.I.	In line of duty	Fracture Simple, Lt Elbow	Favorable	None	USF AFH-2	Retained on board
HOOD, Russell Ernest Ens USNR 386423	(1)(f)	1-7-45 USS LCI(G)-461 Lingayen Gulf PI	In line of duty	Wound, Fragment, Shell, Rt Thigh	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
ALM, Carl Norman FC2c USNR 564 46 80	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf PI.	In line of duty	Fracture, Simple, Rt Ribs.	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
CAMERON, Norman Wilson MOMM1c USNR 244 15 70	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-1028 Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	SPRAIN, Joint, Lt Ankle	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
CRESTOL, Sidney (n) S2c USN 225 54 69	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Blast Concussion Atmospheric	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board

NAME IN FULL RANK OR RATE SERIAL NO.	TYPE OF CAPACITY	DATE & PLACE OF OCCURRENCE	DUTY STATUS	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	FLYING STATUS	SOURCE C ADFL	DISPOSITION
DAVIS, William Brooke CB1(PA) USN 265 49 61	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Blast Concussion, of Atmospheric, Back.	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
DEAN, Hugh Danemore Slc, USNR 886 62 29	(1)(f)	1-10-45 USS LCI(G)-70 Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Wound, Fragment, Shell, Rt Wrist	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
DOOP, Harold Harvey Flc, USNR 866 09 71	(1)(g)	1-6-45 USS COUGHLAN Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Burn, 2nd degree, Multiple.	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
FITZGERALD, James Petrio RM3c USNR 329 46 77	(1)(f)	1-6-45 USS LAMAR Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Wound, Lacerated, Chin.	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
FEDERICCI, Bruno (n) BM2c USNR 820 60 05	(1)(f)	1-10-45 USS LSM-137 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Wound, Fragment, Bomb, Rt Shoulder	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
GAMEL, Charles Snote SC2c USNR 832 38 94	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-1028 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	SPRAIN, JOINT, Rt Knee	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
GIBBONY, Ross Warren Slc USNR 944 43 03	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-1028 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Blast Concussion, of Atmospheric, Back.	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board

NAME IN FULL RANK OR RATE SERIAL NO.	TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE & PLACE OF CASUALTY	DUTY STATUS	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	FINING STATUS	SOURCE ADPH	POSITION
GRADISHER, George Stephen Slc USN 944 25 19	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Fracture, Simple, Rt Clavicle	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Wounded on board
HOOVER, Ronald Chamberlain Bkr2c USNR 922 51 91	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Blast Concussion, of Atmospheric, Back.	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
JOHANSEN, Kenneth Don Slc USN 368 79 28	(1)(g)	1-5-45 USS LCI(G)-70 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Blast Concussion Atmospheric, Back.	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
JUSTIS, Robert Adolphus Slc USNR 836 13 48	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Fracture, Simple, Rt. Clavicle	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
O'DONNELL, Martin James WT3c USNR 823 28 64	(1)(f)	1-10-45 USS LST-1028 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Wound, Fragment, Shell, Lt Forearm.	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
REESE, James Herman S2c USNR 929 53 92	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LCI(G)-70 Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Wound, Fragment, Shell, Lt eye.	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
ROBERTSON, William Claude Cox USNR 847 43 96	(1)(f)	1-11-45 USS LCI-461 Lingayen Gulf, PI.	In line of duty	Wound, Fragment, Shell, Feet.	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board.

NAME, RANK SERIAL NO.	TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE & PLACE OF CASUALTY	DUTY STATUS	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	FLYING STATUS	SOURCE AD. IS.	POSITION
SANCHEZ, Pedro Reaza Slc USNR 841 30 44	(1)(g)	1-1-45 USS LCI(G)-70 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Burn, 2nd degree, multiple	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board
SCHERMERHORN, Leonard "J" Cox USNR 868 46 93	(1)(f)	1-8-45 USS COGHLAN Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Wound, Fragment, Shell, Rt Wrist	Favorable	None	USS COGHLAN	Retained on board
SHUMAKE, Earnest Clifton BM2c USNR 657 79 60	(1)(g)	1-10-45 USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Blast Concussion Atmospheric, internal	Favorable	None	AFH-2	Retained on board

TYPE OF CASUALTY

- (1) Indicates battle casualties
- (2) Indicates non-battle casualties
- (f) Indicates slightly wounded in action (requires hospitalization)
- (g) Indicates slightly injured in action (requires hospitalization)

F. J. DIMEEN,
Lt. Comdr., (MC), USNR.

NAME, RANK SERIAL NO.	TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE & PLACE OF CASUALTY	DUTY STATUS	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	FLYING STATUS	SOURCE OF ADMISSION	DISPOSITION
BARSZCZ, Michael (n) 1st Lt. USA 1301926	(1)(f)	1-11-45 160 Inf 14th Corp 6th Army Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Wound Gunshot, rt chest	Favorable	None	3rd Batt aid Sta.	Retained aboard
WAYNE, Warner Whitman 1st Lt. USA 0428632	(1)(f)	1-11-45 209 AAA Batt 6th Army Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Wounds Shrapnel, rt leg	Favorable	None	3rd Batt aid Sta.	Retained aboard
EVANS, Lemeul Samual Pfc USA 38069190	(1)(g)	1-10-45 Co B 160th Inf 40 div. Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Fracture Compound rt tibia & fibula	Serious	None	115 Clear sta.	Retained aboard
HOFFMAN, Milton Pfc USA 32174257	(1)(g)	1-11-45 Co B 117th Eng. Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Fracture Simple, rt foot	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained aboard
JOHNSON, Lawrance Abe Pfc USA 38100769	(1)(f)	1-11-45 Co B 185 Inf 14th Corp Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Wound Gunshot, lt hip	Favorable	None	7th Evac Hosp.	Retained aboard
KOKALIS, Alexander (n) S Sgt USA 39003366	(1)(f)	1-11-45 Co A 160 Inf 40th Div Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Fracture Compound 3rd finger lt hand	Favorable	None	Co A 160 th Inf	Retained aboard

Page 1 ENCLOSURE (B)

NAME, RANK SERIAL NO	TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE & PLACE OF CASUALTY	DUTY STATUS	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	FLYING STATUS	SOURCE ADMISSION	DISPOSITION
KOVICH, Bennie (n) Pfc USA 32174257	(1)(f)	1-11-45 40th M.P. Batt 14th Corp 6th Army	In line of duty	Wound Gunshot rt shoulder	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
LeMAUX, William Edward Pfc USA 39156469	(1)(f)	1-10-45 Co B 185 Inf Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Wound, Gunshot, chest	Favorable	None	115th Cl Sta.	Retained on board
LOPEZ, Arthur Robert S Sgt USA	((1)(f)	1-10-45 Co B 185th Inf 40th Corp Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Wound Gunshot, lt buttocks	Favorable	None	264 Clear Sta.	Retained on board
MAY, Edward Stanley Pvt USA 33433590	(1)(g)	1-11-45 164 th F'ld Art. Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Fracture Simple (Colle's) rt arm	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
REEVE, Robert Mawson Pfc USA 36731651	(1)(g)	1-10-45 Batt B Med 164 F'ld Art USS LST-925 Lingayen Gulf, PI	In line of duty	Sprain rt wrist	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
MOSS, Andrew (n) Pvt USA 34095551	(2)	1-11-45 164 th B Batt F'ld Art	Not of duty	In line Wound Gunshot, lt buttocks	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board

NAME, RANK SERIAL NO.	TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE & PLACE OF CASUALTY	DUTY STATUS	DIAGNOSIS	PROGNOSIS	FLYING STATUS	SOURCE OF ADVICE	DISPOSITION
PARMENTER, Harold William Pvt USA 39718334	(2) shot accidently	1-11-45 Co F 108th Inf 40th Div Luzon, PI	In line of duty	Wound Gunshot lt foot	Favorable	None	7th Evac Hosp. 40th Div 6th Army	Retained on board
STACK, Barthlomew William Pfc USA 13156131	(2) accident	1-10-45 694th Shore Eng. Lingayen Beach, PI	In line of duty	Fracture Simple, rt tibia	Favorable	None	APH-2	Retained on board
THOMAS, Donald Arthur Pfc USA 36269926	(2)	1-11-45 Co F 160th Inf 40th Div Luzon, PI	In line of duty	Wound Gunshot, great toe lt foot	Favorable	None	Co F 160th Inf 6th Army	Retained on board

TYPE OF CASUALTY

- (1) Indicates battle casualties
- (2) Indicates non-battle casualties
- (f) Indicates slightly wounded in action (requires hospitalization)
- (g) Indicates slightly injured in action (requires hospitalization)

F.J. DINEEN,
Lieut. Comdr., (MC), USNR.

COMMANDER TRANSPORT DIVISION FIVE
(temporary)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

24 January 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: Commander Transport Division FIVE (temp)
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Action Report-U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK dated
15 January 1945.

1. Forwarded.

R. W. Abbott
R. W. ABBOTT
Captain, U.S.N.

11 0786

FILE NO. A16-3

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP THREE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

F-4/ilm

SERIAL NO. 046

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

12 February 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS PRESIDENT POLK Conf.,
ltr. A12 Ser. 02 of 1/15/45.

From: Commander Amphibious Group THREE, Pacific Fleet.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Transport Division THIRTY-EIGHT, (Temp.)
(Captain G.W. Johnson, U.S. Navy).
(2) Commander Amphibious Group SEVEN, Pacific Fleet.
(3) Commander THIRD Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.
(4) Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.
(5) Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.
(6) Commander Administrative Command, Amphibious Forces,
Pacific Fleet.
(7) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK - Action Report Lingayen Assault,
11 - 12 January 1945.

1. Forwarded.

2. The superiority of manila debarkation nets over chain ladders has been stressed repeatedly. Chain ladders are subject to the disadvantages mentioned and also to frequent breakage of wooden rungs. Their replacement by manila nets is recommended.

3. Unloading at Lingayen was not under the direction of this command. Therefore no comment on this portion of report is made, other than to suggest that responsibility for establishing and maintaining communication between the ship and its unloading beach and for salvaging broached ship's boats rests with the ship.

4. COMMUNICATION COMMENTS:

(a) D-2(a). Recalibration of SCR equipment is considered to have been unnecessary in this case. Normally, unless required for a coordinated assault, vessels should use assigned SCR frequencies only. A frequency meter is not required for recalibration and tuning of SCR equipment. An AP, however, is allowed a frequency meter for tuning and checking the other transmitters and receivers.

(b) D-2(b). Every effort should be made by Commanding Officers to maintain continuous training of visual signal personnel, first in accuracy, then in speed, of handling messages. The employment

FILE NO. A16-3

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP THREE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

F-4/film

SERIAL No. 046

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


12 February 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK - Action Report Lingayen Assault,
11 - 12 January 1945. (Continued)

of Yeomen, Storekeepers etc, as visual signal recorders and voice radio operators will enable accomplishment of required communications with otherwise insufficient personnel.

(c) D-2(d). Ample frequencies were assigned, but many commands appeared unaware of the several channels available for their communication. Circuit discipline is a matter of training and indoctrination during periods between operations, and control by net control stations during operations.

(d) Part VIII. The shackle cipher and authenticator system will act as standby IFF challenge and reply between friendly surface units if such be necessary. Example: "This is (Visual call with numerals shackled) I have skunk bearing (shackled numerals) distance (shackled numerals) authenticator FRN, over".



W. E. MOORE,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
CO, USS PRESIDENT POLK.

FE7-36/A16-3

TRANSPORT DIVISION THIRTY SIX
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

/bm

Serial: 0102

4 June 1945


C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS PRESIDENT POLK ltr.,
A12, Ser. 02, dated
15 January 1945.

From: Commander Transport Division THIRTY SIX.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Amphibious Group SEVEN, Pacific Fleet.
(2) Commander THIRD Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.
(4) Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.
(5) Commander Administrative Command, Amphibious Forces,
Pacific Fleet.
(6) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK - Action Report LINGAYEN Assault,
11 - 12 January 1945.

1. Forwarded.
2. Subject report was received 30 May 1945.


Robt. I. F. FRAVEL,
Commander, U.S.N.,
By direction

cc:
CO, U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK

11 0786

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28652

AUG 16 1945

File No.:

AMPHIBIOUS GROUP SEVEN

Gr7/ A16-3

c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

FO/wt

Serial: 0374

CONFIDENTIAL

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AUG 9 1945

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS PRESIDENT POLK
conf. ltr. AP103/A12
Serial 02 of 1/15/45. *15 Jan 45*

From: Commander Amphibious Group SEVEN.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander THIRD Amphibious Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
(2) Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
(3) Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.
Subject: U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK - Action Report LINGAYEN Assault, 11 - 12 January 1945.

1. Forwarded.

RUTLEDGE TOMPKINS
Chief of Staff

cc:
ComTransDiv THIRTY-SIX.
ComPhibGrp THREE.
ComTransDiv FIVE (temp).
CO, USS PRESIDENT POLK (AP 103).

Not

11 0786

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File No. FE25/A16-3(3)

THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER

JL/sn

Serial 0636

CONFIDENTIAL

22 OCT 1945

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS PRESIDENT POLK
conf. ltr. AP103/A12
ser. 02, dated 15 Jan-
uary 1945.

From: Commander Third Amphibious Force (Commander Task
Force 79).
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : Commander Seventh Fleet (Commander Task Force 77).
Subject: U.S.S. PRESIDENT POLK - Action Report LINGAYEN
Assault, 11-12 January 1945.

1. Forwarded.
2. The following comments are submitted:

(a) Basic Report, Part VI, Page 3, Paragraph 4;
Second Endorsement, Paragraph 2.

Comments regarding the unsuitability of chain ladders for troop debarkation and their replacement by manila nets are concurred in.

(b) Basic Report, Part VI, Page 4, Paragraph 1.

Unloading of USS PRESIDENT POLK was changed from Orange Beach to Crimson Beach by CTG 79.2 because of the unsuitability of Orange Beach for unloading. This step was taken after consultation with the Shore Party. All beaches of the LINGAYEN Attack Force were placed under CTG 79.2 on the morning of S+3 (12 Jan. 1945). His Group Beachmaster and the Shore Party (4th Engr. Shore Brigade) continued unloading operations for approximately twenty days.

T. S. Wilkinson
T. S. WILKINSON.

Copy to:
ComPhibGrp 7
ComTransDiv 5 (Temp.)
CO, USS PRESIDENT POLK (AP 103).

11 0786

②

24

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3(F-3-2/Sw)

Serial: 0472

CONFIDENTIAL

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on:
CO, USS PRESIDENT POLK
Conf. Ltr., Serial 02
dated 15 January 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Action Report - USS PRESIDENT POLK - Lingayen Assault
11-12 January 1945.

- 1. Forwarded.

NOV 1945
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ROUTE TO: 03

21 NOV 1945

File No. (S) A16-307/AP103

Doc. No. 191497

Copy No. 1 of 2

Reg. No. F-791

J. H. Long
J. H. LONG
By direction

no