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Sound Navy Yard to the Philippines. The collier *Jason*, while carrying coal to the cruisers *Tennessee* and *North Carolina* in the eastern Mediterranean, carried a cargo of Christmas presents for the children of various belligerent nations and, returning, brought back from European ports exhibits, including some from the art galleries of the Continent, which she transported to the Panama-Pacific International Exposition at San Francisco. The collier *Vulcan*, on one of her trips to the Mediterranean, carried, in addition to coal and stores, a cargo of supplies sent by the American Jewish Relief Committee to the Levant.

There were 18 vessels of the naval auxiliary service in service on June 30 with seven others in reserve. During the fiscal year ended on that date the ships in this service steamed a total of 379,379 miles, delivered 384,497 tons of coal, 257,004 barrels of oil, and delivered 37,213,949 pounds of general freight to naval vessels and stations, together with 2,127 passengers.

The officers and men of the naval auxiliary service are not in the regular service but occupy the same status as officers and men of the merchant marine. In the event of war it would become necessary to place them in the status of officers and enlisted men of the Navy. Otherwise, the auxiliary vessels would necessarily have to be stripped of their merchant complements and regular naval complements placed on board. Either case would necessitate a complete reorganization of the naval auxiliary service at a time when it would be most urgently needed to supply the fleet. As a remedy for this condition the department recommends that Congress enact legislation making the personnel of this service a part of the Naval Reserve so that in the event of war they would automatically become part of the regular Navy.

THE NAVY'S ONLY SUBMARINE DISASTER.

During submarine maneuvers off Honolulu on March 25 an accident occurred to the *F-4* which caused her to sink to a depth of 305 feet, resulting in the loss of her commander, Lieut. A. L. Ede, Ensign T. A. Parker, and the crew of 19 men. It was the first submarine disaster ever sustained by the American Navy, although there have been 17 fatal submarine accidents among the foreign navies during the past 10 years. Heroic effort was made by the naval authorities at Honolulu to locate the missing vessel and save her crew, officers and men working for several days without sleep in this strenuous but fruitless attempt. The vessel was quickly located and everything possible was done with the means at hand, but the apparatus available at Honolulu, including the 150-ton floating derrick, was inadequate for fastening hoisting chains under the vessel and for lifting her, so special devices had to be designed and built.

On April 1 a party of expert deep-sea divers, consisting of Gunner G. D. Stillson and Gunner's Mates Stephen Drellishak, Frank Crilley, Frederick Nielson, and William Loughman, were hurried to Hawaii via *San Francisco*. Some of these men had previously worked at depths of 280 feet. They were accompanied by Passed Asst. Surg. G. R. W. French, United States Navy, who had been associated with them in their record-breaking diving. With the party was sent additional apparatus, including a large recompression tank and plenty of hose.

The U. S. S. *Maryland* was awaiting them at San Francisco, to convey them to the scene of the catastrophe. They took turns in descending to the submarine, which was lying on her side on the slope of a steep undersea mountain, in order to assist the work of fastening cables about her whereby she might be gradually towed into shallower water. The operation was not merely one of dragging the submarine along the bottom, but of lifting her as she was suspended by the cables from the scows above, and then towing her toward the shore. The diver dared remain only about 20 minutes at a time at the bottom, else he would be completely exhausted by the pressure of 138 pounds to the square inch at that depth. (The atmospheric pressure on the surface is only 14.7 pounds to the square inch.) While it required only four minutes to descend for the quarter-hour work with the sunken vessel, it required three hours to rise to the surface, inasmuch as the upward journey had to be made in slow stages. The first lift was 100 feet, made in about 6 minutes; but after that, between each 10 feet of lift, the divers must be allowed a rest period of six or eight minutes to become used to the lessening pressure. Diver Loughman, during one of his descents, became fouled in the cable lines from the hoisting vessels above reaching to the submarine, and was thus entangled for a period of four hours at a depth of 275 feet. He was eventually rescued from his perilous position by Diver Crilley, who risked his life in the effort. Loughman, in a semiconscious condition, had to be kept for nine hours in the recompression tank, and even this did not save him from an attack of pneumonia, from which he slowly recovered.

The diving of these men to raise the unfortunate *F-4* was an act of heroism for which they deserve the thanks of the country. It matched the courage of the immortal crew of the lost submarine, in which they so freely sacrificed their lives in the line of duty. The lifting was five-sixths done when a sudden storm resulted in great damage to the boat, necessitating a new method of procedure. The submarine was then within 50 feet of the surface, but the risk of completing the work with the appliances at hand was too great, and six pontoons were therefore specially constructed at the Mare Island Navy Yard and brought to Honolulu on board the *Maryland*, arriving on August 12. By this means on August 29 the sub-

marine was finally raised. The dead weight lifted was 250 tons, from a depth of 305 feet, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles out from the harbor in the open sea. It was a feat unprecedented in the annals of any navy, and credit therefor belongs in large measure to Rear Admiral C. B. T. Moore, Naval Constructor J. A. Furer, and Lieut. C. E. Smith, in addition to the divers already mentioned. The board of investigation ordered stated in its conclusion, after the most careful investigation and deliberation, as its conception of the disaster, that the primary cause was the corroded condition of the lead lining, and, in consequence, of certain rivets in the port wall of the forward battery steel tank; and the secondary causes, the poor diving qualities of the vessel and its consequent failure promptly to respond to measures taken to bring it to the surface. Only four of the bodies were identified and these were sent to the nearest of kin for interment at home. Fourteen bodies were unidentified, among which it was assumed were the bodies of the two commissioned officers on the vessel, and these 14 were buried in Arlington Cemetery with every honor. Three bodies were not recovered at all. No expense was spared to recover the bodies and raise the submarine. The cost aggregated \$126,639.

NO INCENTIVE FOR PRIVATE GAIN IN PREPAREDNESS.

There are two compelling reasons why during the Sixty-third Congress and in my recommendations to the Sixty-fourth Congress stress has been laid upon the policy that the Government ought to have the plants to manufacture its own munitions as well as its ships:

(1) The principle is sound that there ought to be no incentive to private gain in making preparations for national defense. In certain European countries before the beginning of the present war there were charges in the public press that a propaganda for increased armament was financed by manufacturers who would be enriched by large orders for the products of their plants. The same charge has been made in our own country. Without making inquiry as to the evidence upon which such charges have been made, it may be accepted that the owners of great plants devoted to the manufacture of war supplies will favor that policy which would increase their business and add to their profits. There are agitators for a big Navy who would profit by a large construction program. The Government can not be influenced by those advocating any policy for enriching disciples of "philanthropy and five per cent." These few, however, should not be confounded with the many advocates of a larger Navy who are prompted solely by motives of patriotism.

(2) The only hope of competitive bidding for torpedoes, large guns, ships, and like costly war material, lies in the ability of the