

OUR WAR WITH JAPAN

A Brief History of Events Ending March, 1917

BY ATHERTON BROWNELL.

Not within my memory has my country been immersed in so deep gloom as that which today pervades it. A year ago when suddenly, almost without warning, we found ourselves plunged into this fateful war with Japan, Congress made its declaration gravely; but throughout the country there was a feeling almost of joy, only slightly suppressed, that the time had come forcibly to advance our trade conquest to the Far East and take that dominance of the Pacific Ocean which for generations had been held up by our publicists as our right by manifest destiny. Today we find ourselves chafing in leash, stung by a series of defeats that would be overwhelming to a less determined nation, blocked and checked from retrieving our lost fortunes and held only by a dogged determination to bring all of our resources to bear to save our national pride and possessions.

All thoughtful men agree with me that in these wonderful resources of ours—the possession within ourselves of all things needed for the waging of a great war—we have that which will enable us finally to retrieve ourselves; but at all points we have met with surprises—our own unpreparedness and the foresight of our enemies, that have made it possible for them at once to place us on the defensive, to seize all of the strategic points and place us under a handicap that will take up years in time, millions in money and thousands of lives to overcome.

One year ago we were more than the equal of our adversaries on the sea; immensely more efficient, numerically, in men; in possession of the strategic points to govern the Pacific and sweep it; too far removed from an enemy's base to permit it to strike us, and vastly greater in wealth and the sinews of war. Today we are weaker in ships; our army is bottled up at home; our possessions in the Pacific, once an element of strength, have been turned into bases for our enemies from which they menace our coast-line; the Panama Canal might as well not have been built, since it is today a weakness to be protected rather than a source of strength, and we retain only that wealth which, sinew though it be, is paralyzed with fear and forebodings of the morrow.

It is not my present purpose to set down here more than a brief resume, for future reference, of the steps leading up to this situation, to note in the illuminating light of results those things we should have done that were left undone, and those things that we have done that were better left undone. To some more vivid writer than I will I leave the description of the battle of Pearl Harbor Lochs, which first awakened us to the gravity of our plight and to the seriousness of the problem that lay before us. Looking back now, it is easy to see that for a decade—ever since the close of the Russian-Japanese War—we by our laissez-faire policy had been laying ourselves liable for this judgment, while our enemies had been preparing themselves to meet it.

It was at about that time I first visited Japan and saw many of the then inconsidered trifles that have since grown into causes of war, which strained our previously friendly relations, and in which we blindly precipitated the situation that now confronts us. Well do I remember visiting the flour mills of Osaka, in which the Japanese had adopted all of the most improved flour-milling machinery without going through the form of acquiring patent rights, so that not in our own country could such perfect and complete plants be found. It did not seem to me then—this was in 1905—that this meant other than a greatly increased consumption of American wheat from our northwestern wheat-fields, nor did I then connect the Chinese boycott, from which American flour suffered principally, with any concerted effort to drive this American product from the markets of the Far East.

In the arrogance of my Americanism—an arrogance which we are all repenting today—I saw only the farsightedness of James J. Hill in persistently teaching the Asiatics to abandon their rice in favor of wheat, in order to create a new market for the great fields tapped by his railroad system as a feeder to his great steamship line, which, together with those of the Pacific Mail, gave us the bulk of the carrying trade on the Pacific and compensated us somewhat for our chagrin on perceiving, when too late, that all of our Atlantic trade had passed into the hands of our commercial rivals.

It is an old adage that "foresight is better than hindsight," and it is a hindsight view of all of these things that I am now taking. Had they appeared to me then as they do now, so clear and all pointing in one direction, I would have raised my voice to its uttermost pitch to warn my countrymen of what impended, though, truth to tell, I doubt that it would have been heard, for so engrossed were we in affairs of the moment that we could not look to the future.

I may seem to be laying undue stress upon this matter of wheat, but it was a straw which should have shown the direction in which the wind was blowing. The close of the Russian-Japanese war had left Japan in possession of Korea and indirectly of Manchuria. True, the terms of the treaty of peace at Portsmouth had restored Manchuria to China, but as a result of the Chinese war ten years before, Japan had obtained a dominance of the Celestial Empire that did not appear in its fullest until the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1910. Then it was perceived that Japan had been working secretly to that end for many years.

As early as 1905 Japanese arms had been smuggled into Shanghai for use in any emergency. The German officers of the Chinese army had been dismissed and their place taken by Japanese. American concessions in China in

telephones and railroads had been forfeited and, in each case, had been financed by Japanese capitalists, who, in turn, had secured their capital in Great Britain and the United States. A pro-Japanese party quietly had come into being in China and the new dynasty might as well have been Japanese in name. But even previous to the fall of the Manchu dynasty, Manchuria had been governed by the Chinese troops under Japanese officers and its rich wheat fields had been worked by Japanese coolies.

It is necessary to go back another step fully to appreciate the causes of the disaster that has overwhelmed us, and among our sins must be reckoned those of omission. Even when we awoke to the fact that our maritime supremacy on the Atlantic had been lost, and that we possessed no merchant marine worthy of the name, adequate measures were not taken to restore us to our original position. True, bills were introduced into Congress providing for the granting of subsidies to our rivals. But "subsidy" has always been an offensive word to our people. Legislation directly looking to the creation of a naval auxiliary of merchant ships to be at the call of the Government in case of need seemed not to occur to our Congressmen.

Our traditional policy of old, which built up our merchant marine in the beginning by discriminating in favor of American ships in the matter of the duties on goods brought in them, was not revived. Instead, direct subsidy legislation was urged, but was so opposed that no legislation of an effective character was possible. It was half-hearted and practically valueless in the matter of really bringing into existence a merchant fleet that could cooperate with our navy in time of need. Furthermore, because of the hostility of certain interests, the Philippine tariff bill failed of enactment, and this stimulus to our over-seas trade on the Pacific was allowed to languish.

The first direct result of this action followed in 1908, when the Great Northern Railroad Co., disgusted and with patience at an end, listened to the persuasion of Japanese emissaries and sold its entire steamship holdings to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, that company having received an enormous subsidy from the Japanese Government to make the transaction possible. Then began a rate war such as no ocean had seen before. Manned by Chinese sailors and partly aided by the inadequate marine bill, the Pacific Mail undertook to meet this new competition. But for years, largely because of sentiment, it had maintained a line of steamers down the west coast to Panama which, because of the postal contract with the United States, had made schedule sailings difficult and had eaten heavily into the Trans-Pacific profits to maintain it. The new Japanese lines, running with American ships and manned with Japanese sailors, now cut freight rates to a point which made competition without heavy subsidy impossible.

Mr. Harriman had previously refused to sell the ships of the Pacific Mail to the Japanese lines and there ensued a struggle that was titanic—Harriman alone against all of Japan. To meet this, Japan increased the already great tax

on tobacco, long a government monopoly, since it shrewdly froze the American Tobacco Trust out of its borders. It increased its taxes on all luxuries and, as in the war with Russia, her people met these taxes more than half way, cheerfully, in order to provide their country with the sinews of commercial warfare. It even went further, for, however the Pacific Mail dropped its rate to meet Japanese competition, Japanese shippers refused to ship by it. Chinese shippers, under Japanese influence, renewed their boycott on American goods and American ships, more quietly and more effectually. The Philippine trade, which might have kept this line alive, had already been strangled by our refusal to grant our wards any preference in our tariff restrictions, so after two years of struggle the various ships of the Pacific Mail went under foreign control and our flag disappeared from the Pacific, as it had from the Atlantic a generation or two before.

All this time the Manchurian wheat-fields had been yielding crops which were being ground in Japanese mills. The entire trade of the Orient was Japan's and, to add insult to injury, Japan began sending her flour to the United States and underselling us in our own country. Having the crops gathered by coolie labor, the wheat ground in mills using American patented machinery that paid no royalties, operated by yellow labor at fifty cents per day, and the flour transported in ships so heavily subsidized as to make it possible to lower the freight rates fully one-half, the first industrial blow was struck at our wheat-fields and at the American farmer, who thereafter found the smiling face of prosperity turned rigidly away from him. What was true of wheat became also true of cotton, and our sole market in the Orient remained that of agricultural implements, though even here favoritism and other causes sent the Oriental customer to Scotland and Belgium.

It was about this time that the United States awoke to the fact that our consumption, great as it was, had not increased as rapidly as our production, and for the first time in our history we were obliged to seek foreign markets for our goods. The unexampled prosperity of our country from the year 1902 to 1909 had so stimulated industrial activity that we were over-producing in all commodities, and when we sought an outlet in the East, Japan, with its cheap labor, had already closed the open door of the Orient to us, not by diplomatic measures which could have been resented by force of arms, but by commercial strategy. The European markets had long since been denied us because of our "stand-pat" policy on the tariff, which had made it impossible to compete with the pauper labor of Europe. Our tariff wall, originally erected for protection, had become the wall of our industrial grave, wide and deep, but encompassing all.

The last years of President Roosevelt's third term were serious ones. The industrial depression following the years of unprecedented prosperity was laid wholly at the door of the Administration. President Roosevelt's prestige had grown enormously after his apparently successful fight against the Standard Oil Company, until it was

made evident that, though dissolved as a legal corporation, the component parts still wriggled in a way so consistent as to suggest life, and disgusted the socialistic element, which demanded even more radical measures. Senator Beveridge of Indiana received the Republican nomination, on a platform drafted by President Roosevelt, it is believed; but this proved to be far too conservative for the Socialist Labor Party.

SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY CANDIDATE ELECTED.

The Democratic party had ceased to have any existence since 1908, when its nominee was William Randolph Hearst; but its place was taken in 1912 by the Socialist Labor Party, which nominated for the Presidency Honorable Michael McMurphy of San Francisco, who had sprung into prominence almost miraculously as a

California Labor Leader. McMurphy was elected by an overwhelming majority, and organized labor was in the saddle in all branches of the government.

It is not my purpose to write a detailed history of those years, nor to deal with the internal policy of the United States at that troublous time; only in so far as the acts then done and the things left undone apply to this war with Japan are they necessary. President McMurphy was a man whose prototype was Dennis Kearney, to whose instrumentality do the Chinese owe their exclusion from this country. For many years had California protested against the admission of the Japanese and urged their exclusion, which stung the Japanese just as they were emerging from a victorious war with a world-power, and wounded their newly inflated pride. A little later renewed offense was given to Japan by California through the attempted exclusion of the Japanese from the public schools.

The diplomatic policy of President Roosevelt, together with the self-interest of the Japanese in desiring more American capital for the Manchurian wheat fields, caused these troubles to be smoothed over for the time being; but the sentiment of California, our frontier to Japan, remained rigidly hostile and no chance was overlooked to express that feeling. In season and out of season, the representatives of California, led by Senator Shantry, urged upon the country not the "yellow" but the "brown peril," and gradually, as the success of the commercial rivalry of the Japanese began to be seen, and their whole plan of trade conquest of the Orient realized, the sentiment of the country approximated that of our Pacific coast.

A thousand incidents, each insignificant in itself, added cumulatively to the sum total, and when Japan, after crowding our own goods out of the Orient began sending similar products back to us in American-built ships, the last straw had been added to the camel's back. First we saw the spectacle of a heavy tariff on the importation of wheat, cotton, etc., from the Orient, practically prohibitive. This was the first important act of the new Congress, and in his message in December, 1913, President McMurphy threw all reserve to the wind and bitterly arraigned the "Yankees of the Orient." The passage of the wheat tariff bill followed in the spring of 1914, although it was not until the next session that the crowning act of folly was committed, namely, the passage of the Japanese exclusion act which not only closed our ports to all Japanese imports but to all Japanese, and ordered every Japanese in this country, not a naturalized citizen, to depart within two months.

JAPANESE EXCLUSION ACT A BOOMERANG.

The effect of this order may readily be imagined. American goods had long been tabooed in the Orient under Japanese domination. Our treaty rights in the treaty ports remained technically perfect, since to violate them would have been to precipitate the war before Japan was ready. Ten years had elapsed since Japan had emerged from her conflict with Russia triumphant but bankrupt. During these years her commercial policy had returned enormous dividends. She had borrowed heavily from England and the United States and, with this capital, had developed the rich mines of Saghalien obtained from Russia by the peace terms. The mines of Manchuria, though nominally Chinese, had yielded enormous returns to the Japanese exploiters. The wheat fields had lain all of the Orient under tribute to Japan, and little Korea had been wrung out

of all of her possessions by the skillful manipulation of Marquis Ito.

The Japanese navy, increased after the war with Russia, had gone on in building until in number of ships, in armament and men, it nearly equaled our own. Its force in the Pacific was in excess of ours. Moreover, it was manned by Japanese, trained under officers who had been trained at Annapolis, and its ships had been constructed by the best brains of America, imported for the purpose. Our one element of strength seemed to be in the fact that we were beyond striking distance from Japan, across seven thousand miles of ocean, while the steaming radius of the big battleships was but five thousand miles. In potential strength in men we were about twice as strong as Japan; but here again Japan was stronger in effective strength, since she had a merchant marine with our own ships as a basis from which to take transports, while we had practically none.

This was the situation when the Japanese exclusion act was passed. Japan was instantly in a blaze and, throwing off her usual smiling face, demanded its retraction. Count Tera-shima, now Prime Minister, did not mince his words when he said: "The subjects of the Mikado refuse to be insulted and placed in the light of being an inferior people." Secretary of State Levinson replied in a dignified manner, but with the positive assertion that this country demanded the exclusion of all Japanese. Then followed the Tokio and Kioto riots when the American Ambassador was driven fleeing down the streets in his night garments and Americans were assaulted on all sides. So serious became the attacks upon all Americans that, in addition to diplomatic protests, the battleship Kentucky with the armored cruiser New York and the protect cruiser Denver were dispatched from Manila. Every one knows the result. Marines were landed without opposition, only to be attacked by a Japanese force, while the ships were attacked in the harbor by a squadron of three Japanese battleships and four cruisers, and quickly sunk.

No declaration of war had been made; none seemed to be required. It appears now that Japan had been preparing for this step as the one thing necessary to destroy forever our prestige in the Far East and to secure for herself the Philippine Islands which, after eighteen years of American occupation, were beginning to demonstrate to the world their wonderful richness and commercial value.


Though backward in development, owing to our policy regarding them, it had been shown beyond peradventure that their mineral deposits, gold, silver, copper and coal, were rich; that their yield of hemp, rubber, gutta-percha, cocoa and hard woods were beyond the dreams of avarice, and, the development work being well advanced, no better time could be found than the present to seize them.

The sinking of the Kentucky was sufficient cause of war, just as the sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbor was sufficient cause for war with Spain in the latter part of the last century. But here there was no question of doubt as to responsibility. The country, having run headlessly into this situation, was agnost at its results. Congress fortunately was in session and its deliberations were brief. The Kentucky and her accompanying cruisers sailed from Manila on February 14th, 1915. They arrived in the Bay of Yeddo on February 15th and they were sunk on the 19th. Congress declared war on the 22nd.

Although the friction had been acute for many months, actual war was precipitated so suddenly that the Navy

captured them.

THE JAPANESE SWARMED LIKE ANTS INTO OUR INCOMPLETE BATTERIES AT PEARL HARBOR, CAPTURING THEM.



RIOTS IN TOKIO AND KIOTO FOLLOWED THE JAPANESE EXCLUSION ACT, AMERICANS BEING ASSAULTED ON ALL SIDES.

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THE AMERICAN FLEET AT HAWAII, OUTNUMBERED, OVERWHELMED BY WEIGHT OF METAL, AND WITHOUT REFUGE, FOUGHT UNTIL THE LAST STAR ON THE HIGHEST PENNANT HAD SUNK BENEATH THE WAVES.

OUR WAR WITH JAPAN

(Continued from Page Five.)

Department had scarcely made any adequate preparations. Our Pacific Squadron had not been augmented, for, as the Panama Canal had been opened in 1915, it was felt that we could quickly reinforce it. Olongapo, Subig Bay, in the Philippines had been selected as the naval station not without opposition from naval authorities, based chiefly on the ground that it was forty-five miles from Manila, which was consequently left unprotected. The sum of five million dollars had been appropriated for a naval station there by the Sixty-first Congress, but, while some repair shops had been erected and supplies furnished, little had been done to make it worthy of the name. Here, previous to the departure of the Kentucky, were three battleships and four armored cruisers, while at Manila were one battleship, two armored cruisers, four small cruisers and three of the old type monitors.

In his message to Congress in 1905 President Roosevelt pointed out that "the most important step in the Pacific Ocean is the fortification of Pearl Harbor," in the Hawaiian Islands. Because of the personal interest in the naval station at Subig Bay and perhaps, also, because of the enormous expenditures incident upon the completion of the Panama Canal, this warning had not been fully heeded. The Hawaiian Islands are the only spots of land in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator where a ship may coal, get water or supplies. They were our outposts—our base for operation against an enemy two thousand miles from our coast line or, as the case unhappily has proved, the basis of attack, a menace in the hands of the enemy. Had President Roosevelt's warning been heeded in time, the country's state of mind would today have been far different and a more agreeable history might have been written.

Here were two battleships, one coast-defense ship, two armored cruisers, and seven unprotected cruisers, while along the Pacific Coast, at Mare Island, and at Puget Sound were six battleships, six coast-defense ships, four armored cruisers and sixteen unprotected cruisers, together with eight torpedo-boat destroyers, fifteen torpedo-boats and eight submarines. The entire United States navy otherwise was in the Atlantic. This was the situation on the fateful day, February 20th, when the country read the wireless message telling what had happened in the Bay of Yeddo, that spot where Perry first opened Japan to the world. The relative strength of the fleets of the two countries in Pacific water was as follows:

	United States.	Japan.
Battleships	12	25
Coast-defense ships	12	6
Armored cruisers	12	26
Protected cruisers, 1st class	4	5
Protected cruisers, 2nd class	11	15
Protected cruisers, 3rd class	12	13
Torpedo-boat destroyers	8	100
Torpedo-boats	15	90
Submarines	8	20

JAPAN'S SHIPS IN ADVANCE OF OURS.

Even these figures do not show the overwhelming superiority of the Japanese on the Pacific, for, particularly in battleships and armored cruisers, Japan's ships were far in advance of ours in construction and in date. Of her battleships twelve were of the terrible Dreadnought model, the smallest and oldest being of 19,000 tons, launched in 1905, while the others were respectively of 21,000 and 23,000 tons. On our Atlantic coast our effective strength was as follows: 27 battleships, 5 coast defense ships, 12 armored cruisers, 9 first-class protected cruisers, 14

second class cruisers, 18 third class cruisers, 12 torpedo boat destroyers, 25 torpedo boats and 12 submarines. Thus, while our strength on the Atlantic was, save in torpedo-boats and destroyers, quite equal to that of Japan's entire navy, it was upon the Pacific that the war was to be waged, and there Japan had 618,000 tons against our 431,000 tons. This is the essence of Japanese strategy, to outnumber your opponent and to strike him quickly. We were already outnumbered in the arena of action, and we quickly learned how fast naval blows could be struck. Already, before the declaration of war, our Pacific fleet had been reduced by the loss of a battleship and two cruisers.

If the Navy Department had been slow in preparation, it was not slow to act. All the ships at the moment in the Philippines were needed there for defense, and reinforcements were necessary. The importance of holding the Hawaiian Islands was instantly appreciated, and to the seven ships then there were dispatched two battleships and two cruisers from the Pacific. From the Atlantic Coast the greatest war fleet ever assembled under the American flag was hastily brought together and dispatched via the Panama Canal.

This fleet was composed as follows: Ten battleships led by the 23,000 ton Pennsylvania, Admiral Wainwright's flagship; eight armored cruisers; five first class cruisers; seven second class cruisers; nine third class cruisers, together with twelve destroyers and twenty torpedo-boats, and on each battleship was a submarine.

The energy and promptness with which this great fleet was mobilized raised the hopes of our people to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, to a height, indeed, from which the fall was the greater. It was believed that its orders were to separate at the Pacific entrance to the canal into three squadrons, one to go to the relief of Manila, one to the Hawaiian Islands and one to reinforce the Pacific Coast. It was expected that a Japanese fleet would be in waiting here to give battle; but as the days passed no word came of any such fleet. The news that did come was so unexpected, so appalling in its nature, that the nation stood stunned.

THE DISASTER IN THE PANAMA CANAL.

It was on March 3rd that our fleet from Hampton Roads entered the Panama Canal at Colon. The way was led by the Kearsarge followed by the Maine, and then the Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, and the cruisers Chicago, Minneapolis, Boston, and Philadelphia. These were to make the passage of the canal first, leaving the remainder of the fleet at anchor at Colon. A fleet of torpedo-boats and destroyers was first sent through to protect the exit of the main fleet at the Pacific side. When the Kearsarge was in the lock at La Boca an explosion in one of the culverts rent the lock-gates open, and the flood of imprisoned waters rushed through, carrying the Kearsarge with it and effectually jamming her in the lock-gates. Behind her poured the flood from the high pressure mechanism of the locks in its rush. Almost simultaneously the Gatun locks were similarly destroyed and, open at both ends, the incalculable pressure of the water behind them made it impossible to dam the flow. Thus, in a moment, were nine of our best war ships put out of action as effectually as if they had been sunk, since the opened locks quickly drained the artificial lakes on which they floated and in a short time left them stranded, high and dry, twenty miles inland. By the same stroke the remainder of our fleet at Colon was at once removed, in distance, twelve thousand miles from its objective point, making necessary the voyage around Cape Horn

along a neutral coast, without coaling stations and, moreover, without cutlers, since they had not been considered necessary.

THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS ATTACKED.

Before this news had penetrated all parts of the country a second blow was struck, this time at the Hawaiian Islands, which have aptly been called "the key to the Pacific." Two days after the disaster at the Panama Canal a Japanese fleet appeared in Oahu Channel. It consisted of the giant battleships Asaka, Jingoro and Klusu, two battleships of 16,000 tons, six armored cruisers, one first class, two second class and seven third class protected cruisers. Opposed to them we could place but two battleships, one coast-defense monitor of the old type two armored cruisers, three second class and four third class protected cruisers.

Supporting these were the land batteries at Pearl Harbor Lochs, our coal supply and naval repair station, and at Moanalua. For a half a century our naval strategists had pointed out to the country the importance of Pearl Harbor Lochs and the Hawaiian Islands as a strategic vantage ground from which the entire Pacific Ocean could be swept by the fleet holding them. In 1898 the group was annexed and made a territory. In 1900 a bill passed Congress providing for the purchase of land for a coaling and naval station. The channel was dredged out, but here the matter rested for ten years, when in 1910 the appropriation of five million dollars was made as the first step toward making Pearl Harbor as impregnable as Gibraltar. To the Panama Canal it occupied the same relation as the island of Malta to the Suez Canal, and from it, with a radius of twenty-five hundred miles, our fleet could sweep our own entire Pacific coast, the Aleutian Islands as well as the southern islands of Fiji and Samoa. It was our first stepping stone to the Far East, of which the second was Wake Island, the third Guam and the Philippines the fourth.

WHO HOLDS HAWAII HOLDS THE PACIFIC.

The holder of this strategic point must of necessity be master of the Pacific, since no fleet save that of Great Britain could successfully operate against our Pacific Coast so long as it was in our possession; but once gained as a foothold by a foreign power it became a menace. It is the apex of a triangle of which the base is our coast line. It is like the one pass in a vast mountain range, the one point that must be held by us for defense, or by our opponents for successful offense. Not a merchant ship could cross the Pacific from the United States to the Orient, from the Panama Canal to Asia, from Canada to Australia or New Zealand, without passing through the zone commanded by the ships of the nation having their base of supplies here. Hence, tardily, we had begun the work of fortification, which work was perhaps 30 per cent. completed when the Japanese fleet appeared in Oahu Channel.

In our blindness and self-sufficiency, another point had been overlooked. In 1884 there were 116 Japanese residents in the Hawaiian Islands, and in the following sixteen years they had increased to twelve thousand and more. In the next six years the Japanese population of Honolulu had doubled, having reached over twenty-four thousand. The admission of Hawaii as a territory brought it within the restrictions of the Chinese exclusion law. The sugar planters of Hawaii, needing labor, were driven, perforce, to the encouragement of Japanese immigration to till the fields, and in four years more this class of population had again more than doubled, having reached sixty-one thousand. Up to 1910 this increase had continued until there were, at a fair estimate, one hundred and forty thousand of them domiciled here, and since 1906 the new-comers were largely discharged veterans of the Japanese army seeking occupation. The American population of the Hawaiian Islands was about eight thousand, not

including the five thousand soldiers stationed there. These, then, were the conditions at the battle of Pearl Harbor Lochs, which will go down to history along with the story of the Alamo and the Battle of Lake Erie.

The Japanese fleet had divided itself into two squadrons, one of which, consisting of two battleships, two armored cruisers and seven protected cruisers—about our own weight—appeared in the channel, while the second remained in concealment behind Moakai. Already the news had reached Honolulu of the disaster to our fleet at Panama. Furthermore, it was known that no reinforcement could be expected from the Pacific Coast, since Seattle, Portland and San Francisco were in terror lest a fleet should come coasting down from the north and threaten bombardment. Our previous disasters had driven reason away and no argument as to the strength of our coast defenses or of the impossibility of battleships operating seven thousand miles from their base could persuade our coast-dwellers of their safety. Particularly was this true in San Francisco, which had risen from its ashes in wonderful splendor.

Cut off from all immediate hope of reinforcement, our fleet at Pearl Harbor sallied forth to battle, little realizing the force with which it had to cope. Under the support of the guns from Moanalua the battle began, but it was plainly the desire of the Japanese fleet to draw the Americans away from their land support. From an eyewitness I have since learned that it first appeared that the American fleet was driving on to a glorious victory. Our marksmanship was something wonderful to behold, and slowly the Japanese were driven away from the channel and out to the open sea, our own fleet pursuing. The land guns became silent as the range lengthened, and all eyes were strained to the north. Suddenly, from the south, around Moakai, appeared the second Japanese squadron, the three great battleships, four armored cruisers, three smaller cruisers, preparing to engage the land batteries separately. Simultaneously with this came a land attack from 30,000 Japanese, organized, armed and equipped. The first bombardment of the incomplete land batteries from the war ships was terrific, and when it ceased, the Japanese land forces swarmed like ants into the batteries and captured the guns. Now between two fires and without the support of its land batteries the American fleet, outnumbered, overwhelmed by weight of metal and without refuge, fought until the last star on the highest pennant had sunk beneath the waves. The Japanese suffered severe damage, but our own repair shops were now theirs, and the key to the Pacific was in their hands.

(To be continued tomorrow.)

THE "VIAMI" SYSTEM OF TREATMENT.

That doctors will disagree is very natural. There are a large number of people who don't believe in operation. The Viami Company is reported as not believing in operations, miscellaneous. Some operations they believe are necessary, but for the most part, it seems they believe that curative methods are better. This is a doctrine which the Viami Company has preached and practiced for over twenty years, and it finds its echo in the assertions of many of the ablest leading medical men, and notably in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal of November 29, 1906, and the New York Medical Journal of December 16, 1906. An unusual, unique and interesting fact as to the business of the Viami Company is that it is conducted largely by the women who have been cured. It extends all over the world. Upon investigation, it is found that the author of the attacks on the Viami Company appears to be a man with no practice; he does not appear to be very well known, although he has been a long time in San Francisco. There does not appear anywhere flagrant evidences of the success of his methods. There does appear everywhere the evidence of success of the Viami methods. These may not occur in every instance. The founders do not believe they can guarantee success in every case. There is one fact that stands in salient relief, and that is that the modern trend has been largely in the direction of natural methods.

The Viami people have been staunch supporters of San Francisco—none more so. Men of character and reputation do not live in a community for twenty years without being thoroughly known, and every one who knows the laws knows that they are men of probity and standing, and it is generally conceded that there are no men in the city who have done more to rehabilitate it by placing every dollar of their earnings in action. The Viami building on Pine street, near Stockton, is the highest type of class "A" reinforced concrete construction in the city. It is just being completed. It covers a quarter of an acre of ground. The News-Letter regrets exceedingly that the photograph of this building was not ready in time for publication in this issue.

It is probably an interesting fact, not commonly known, that it takes twenty dollars to sell the first dollar's worth of any proprietary remedy. Unless the remedy is good, unless it creates friends, unless it accomplishes the purpose which it attempts, that nineteen dollars is lost. There are thousands upon thousands of proprietary remedies upon which enormous fortunes have been lost. The good remedies tell their own story!—From San Francisco News-Letter.

Mrs. F. Sackwitz, 1118 Gulick avenue, representative.

DR. JORDAN IN TOWN.

President David Starr Jordan of Stanford was in town yesterday up to about 1 p. m. and had a busy time. He breakfasted at the University Club and lunched at the Alexander Young, in the meantime visiting the Aquarium, the Fishmarket and the Bishop Museum. He was looking for new specimens of fish but found none.

THE SWEET GIRL GRADUATE

will look sweeter than usual this year, for the materials to be used for graduation dresses are the prettiest ever. We have made a special effort to get the very best, and hope that our selections will be yours. Ehlers.



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